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EXTRALEGAL WHITEWASHES
Lesley Wexler*
"If you don't like what's being said, change the conversation."
Don Draper'
INTRODUCTION
Do class action and other high-profile lawsuits change corporate so-
cial behavior and create corporate social responsibility? While the an-
swer is decidedly mixed,2 the litigation literature focuses on measures
* Professor and Thomas A. Mengler Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law.
Thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Jessica Clarke, and Naomi Schoenbaum for helpful com-
ments. Many thanks also to Marissa Meli and Lisa Koerner for research assistance.
1. Mad Men: Blowing Smoke (AMC television broadcast Oct. 10, 2010). In the popular televi-
sion show Mad Men, the advertising agency Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce was fired by its largest
client, Lucky Strike. Concerned that bad press would cause other clients to jump ship, creative
director Don Draper went on the offensive. Rather than acknowledge its firing or its shortcom-
ings, Draper had the agency take out a full page advertisement in the New York Times proclaim-
ing its concerns about smoking's health risks and announcing that it will no longer accept
cigarette companies as clients. Don Draper hoped this move would allow Sterling Cooper
Draper Pryce to craft its reputation as an industry leader, and shortly thereafter the agency
landed a high-profile pro-bono anti-smoking campaign.
The full transcript of the advertisement reads as follows:
Recently my advertising agency ended a long relationship with Lucky Strike ciga-
rettes, and I'm relieved.
For over 25 years we devoted ourselves to peddling a product for which good work is
irrelevant, because people can't stop themselves from buying it. A product that never
improves, that causes illness, and makes people unhappy. But there was money in it.
A lot of money. In fact, our entire business depended on it. We knew it wasn't good
for us, but we couldn't stop.
And then, when Lucky Strike moved their business elsewhere, I realized, here was
my chance to be someone who could sleep at night, because I know what I'm selling
doesn't kill my customers.
So as of today, Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce will no longer take tobacco accounts.
We know it's going to be hard. If you're interested in cigarette work, here's a list of
agencies that do it well: BBDO, Leo Burnett, McCann Erickson, Cutler Gleason &
Chaough, and Benton & Bowles.
As for us, we welcome all other business because we're certain that our best work is
still ahead of us.
Sincerely, Donald F. Draper, Creative Director
Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce.
2. Compare Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for
Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 935 (2005) (citing studies that found
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of legal compliance. Yet compliance is only one piece of the puzzle.
In addition to choosing a compliance strategy, corporate actors can
also deploy extralegal behavior to respond to high-profile litigation.
This extralegal behavior-action taken in the shadow of the law-de-
serves additional scrutiny. 3 Many have written about how litigation or
regulation, or the threat thereof, can spark self-regulation; however,
self-regulation is only one tool within corporations' extralegal toolbox.
This Article investigates a different extralegal response-the
whitewash. 4
To take on this challenge of theorizing corporations' extralegal tool-
box, this Article begins by briefly explaining the interaction of reputa-
tion and corporate wrongdoing. In assessing the reasons why
companies care about internal and external perceptions, I look at the
practice of whitewashing across various substantive areas, such as the
environment and human rights. As this literature does not emphasize
the role of law, I then provide a multi-element definition of an extrale-
gal whitewash. In so doing, I spell out the necessary predicate and
substantive behavior on the part of a corporate wrongdoer. I also pro-
vide some guidance for conceptualizing the causation and intent char-
acteristics of the washing definition. As no uniform definition of
"washing" yet exists, this Article offers a useful focal point to unite
the disparate studies across disciplines and substantive legal areas.
In order to explore the underpinnings of a specific type of white-
wash, this Article reviews Wal-Mart's response to the Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes class action litigation as a potential example of an
extralegal whitewash. During the ten-plus years of this historic em-
ployment discrimination suit, Wal-Mart has steadfastly denied any sys-
tematic pay and promotion discrimination against its female associates
and managers, 5 and it has successfully challenged the certification of a
class action suits fail to change corporate behavior over the long-term), with Melissa Hart, The
Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REv.
1623 (2007) (discussing the transformative potential of sex discrimination class action lawsuits),
and Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic
Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCy L. REV. 71 (2006) (identifying the benefits of class actions in
the civil rights context).
3. See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and
Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20
ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 561, 562 (2003). As I have suggested in the international law context,
law can push actors towards second-best behavior, even when they are not legally bound to
engage in either first- or second-best behavior.
4. As explained below, whitewashes may, but need not, include self-regulation.
5. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)
(No. 10-277) ("Discriminatory decisions made by individual managers within such an objectively
nondiscriminatory system are, by definition, aberrational and unauthorized rather than 'com-
mon' or 'typical."').
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nationwide class. 6 In addition to its litigation strategy, the company
has also attempted to restore its public image as female friendly, while
simultaneously funding efforts to undercut the potential of future class
action lawsuits. Feminists and workers' rights advocates have decried
Wal-Mart's actions as mere "gender washing." In so doing, they sug-
gest that Wal-Mart is engaging in diversionary behavior without ade-
quately addressing, or even acknowledging, the underlying grievances
of the Dukes plaintiffs.7 For those that believe Wal-Mart is a wrong-
doer, the concern is that a successful gender washing would allow Wal-
Mart to both avoid systematic reform of its employment practices and
overcome the Dukes-induced reputational harms. For academics, re-
gardless of its actual wrongdoing, Wal-Mart provides a useful example
from which to document, explain, and theorize the practice of extrale-
gal whitewashing.
To ground the definition of gender washing as a specific instance of
a whitewash, this Article next takes a critical look at some new poli-
cies and practices undertaken by Wal-Mart in relation to hiring, pro-
motion, and women's issues more generally. Part III documents how
such policies coexist with the failure to acknowledge or remedy the
alleged wrongdoing as well as the perpetuation of gender-unfriendly
policies. Further, this Article seeks to identify the conditions under
which the combination of these actions might constitute extralegal
gender washing by Wal-Mart.
Finally, Part IV addresses the normative implications of extralegal
whitewashing. If one believes an underlying grievance is legitimate,
then extralegal whitewashing seems inherently problematic. Under
the definition of a whitewash, the wrongdoer fails to structurally ad-
dress the identified grievance. But extralegal whitewashing involves
more than a wrongdoer simply ignoring, denying, or avoiding the un-
derlying problem. Actors who engage in an extralegal whitewash seek
to simultaneously prevent the imposition of requested substantive
changes and, relatedly, to avoid reputational costs from litigation by
appearing to be good citizens on social issues. When such extralegal
whitewashing ultimately succeeds in changing the conversation, the
hypocrisy may constitute an additional, though not legally cognizable,
harm to the aggrieved.
Notwithstanding these very real harms, this Article identifies some
conditions under which normatively desirable extralegal whitewashing
is possible. This conclusion may appear counterintuitive at first blush.
6. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556-57 (2011).
7. See infra Part II.
2013]
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If, however, extralegal whitewashes are compatible with externally
imposed structural reform and fail to divert either courts or legisla-
tures from acting to remedy the problem, these washes may generate
positive benefits without accomplishing their intended diversion. In
addition, some reformers may simply be unable to get courts, legisla-
tures, or companies to recognize and address their grievances. If such
a failure is likely even without the extralegal whitewash, then that
wash may present a second-best situation in which no one is signifi-
cantly worse off and some subset of other individuals or society bene-
fit. Relatedly, some companies may lose control or have their
interpretation of the problem redefined by an extralegal whitewash
and thus ultimately address the underlying grievance in a manner
sympathetic to the aggrieved's desired remedy. This Article concludes
by noting the role law plays, not only in instigating extralegal white-
washes, but in regulating them as well. It speaks to the larger poten-
tial of, and need for, access to robust substantive law to identify and
remedy certain grievances."
II. WHITEWASHING AS AN EXTRALEGAL RESPONSE
A. Corporation Reputation and Washes
Litigation and legislation can directly compel companies to change
their behavior. In addition, reputation, which often operates in the
shadow of the law, can also dictate new corporate behavior.9 Class
action litigation does not occur in private; it can draw the attention of
interested parties such as employees, 10 stockholders, customers, inves-
tors, and regulators. Such litigation can tarnish a company's reputa-
tion with these parties, even if the court ultimately dismisses the suit
or finds for the defendant.11 Companies, for good reason,12 are in-
8. See generally Robin West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 713 (2011).
9. Keith Weigelt & Colin Camerer, Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A Review of Recent
Theory and Applications, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 443, 454 (1988).
10. Jane E. Dutton et al., Organizational Images and Member Identification, 39 ADMIN. SCI-
ENCE 0. 239, 242 (1994); Janet Dukerich et al., Beauty Is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Impact
of Organizational Identification, Identity, and Image on the Cooperative Behaviors of Physicians,
47 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 507, 511 (2002) (observing that when things are going well, employees
"bask in [the] reflected glory" of their employer's image).
11. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (2003).
12. WEBER SHANDWICK, SAFEGUARDING REPUTATION SURVEY RESULTS ISSUE 1, STRATE-
GIES TO RECOVER REPUTATION 1 (2007), available at http://webershandwick.com/resources/ws/
flash/Safe RepReputation.pdf (reporting that media coverage of reputation alone has in-
creased 108% over the past five years). While reputation is intangible, businesses view it as an
important asset. Peter W. Roberts & Grahame R. Dowling, Corporate Reputation and Sustained
[Vol. 62:817
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creasingly concerned about managing this sort of reputation risk.13
Broadly speaking, a good reputation may help companies achieve
their business goals and maintain competitiveness. 14 Among their va-
rious tools, companies can use corporate social responsibility initia-
tives to enhance their internal and external reputations. 15 Such
initiatives may be particularly important to companies that fear legal
interventions, such as legislation or litigation, because they can both
divert attention away from a grievance and provide a counter narra-
tive of a company's commitment to the social issue that gave rise to
the grievance.
The corporate social responsibility literature has begun investigat-
ing these diversionary tactics under the label of "green washing" in
the environmental context and "blue washing" in the human rights
context.16 The tactic of green washing emerged in the 1970s as an
alternative to total corporate denial of environmental problems, and is
now deployed to garner public, consumer, investor, and regulatory
Superior Financial Performance, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1077, 1077 (2002) ("A growing body of
research argues that good corporate reputations have strategic value for the firms that possess
them. According to a resource-based view, firms with assets that are valuable and rare possess a
competitive advantage and may expect to earn superior returns." (citations omitted)). See gener-
ally BARUCH LEV, BROOKINGS INST., INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND RE-
PORTING 1 (2001); Roger C. Vergin & M.W. Qoronfleh, Corporate Reputation and the Stock
Market, Bus. HORIZONS, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 19, 24.
13. MATEO TONELLO, CONFERENCE BD., REPUTATION RISK: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PERSPECTIVE 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/ConfB
Reputation.pdf.
14. Paul A. Argenti & Bob Druckenmiller, Reputation and the Corporate Brand (Tuck Sch. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 03-13, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmab-
stractid=387860. For example, reputation can affect corporate profitability, market-to-book
value, and total sales. See Roberts & Dowling, supra note 12, at 1078-80. This is particularly
true for companies with very high and very low rankings. See Vergin & Qoronfleh, supra note
12, at 24. Reputation can also drive investment decisions. See Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos et al.,
Cluster Reputation as a Facilitator in the Internationalization of Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises, 9 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 79, 82-83 (2006). In particular, reputation can influence in-
vestment decisions during acquisitions and mergers. Argenti & Druckenmiller, supra, at 14.
15. C.B. Battacharya et al., Strengthening Stakeholder-Company Relationships Through Mu-
tually Beneficial Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives, 85 J. Bus. ETHICS 257, 257-58 (2009)
("[Corporate Social Responsibility] activity has been shown to have a positive effect on job
seeking intent, as well as behaviors on the job like interpersonal cooperation and job-related
effort." (citation omitted)). Most customers may not care deeply about social responsibility, see
Graham Page & Helen Fearn, Corporate Reputation: What Do Consumers Really Care About?,
45 J. ADVERTISING RES. 305, 309 (2005), but some consumers willingly pay a premium to firms
with good social reputations, see Emma Boulstridge & Marilyn Corrigan, Do Consumers Really
Care About Corporate Responsibility?, 4 J. COMMC'N. MGMT. 355, 355 (2000).
16. Not all corporate social responsibility initiatives entail whitewashing, but they are often
seen as synonymous. Cf. Ralph Hamann & Paul Kapelus, Corporate Social Responsibility in
Mining in Southern Africa: Fair Accountability or Just Greenwash?, DEV., Sept. 2004, at 85, 88.
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support. 17 Companies choose to promote their environmental initia-
tives in order to get "maximum accolades for minimum change. '18
Modern-day examples of green washing include car companies that
create and promote a single hybrid car amidst a much larger fleet of
fuel inefficient cars while lobbying against fuel efficiency standards. 19
Another particularly vivid example, in light of its recent deep-water
drilling scandal, is British Petroleum's rebranding itself as "Beyond
Petroleum" 20 and launching an advertising campaign claiming, "We
fill you up with sunshine. '21
In turn, this green washing discussion spawned a secondary litera-
ture about blue washing, in which companies seek the imprimatur of
the United Nations (U.N.) to sanitize their global practices.22 While
green washing is limited to those practices designed to improve a com-
pany's environmental image, blue washing allows companies to im-
prove multiple dimensions of its corporate image by aligning with the
U.N. 23 Companies hope that association with the U.N. will provide an
informal stamp of approval and a brand spillover.
Scholars and activists routinely cite the 1999 Global Compact as a
particularly visible form of blue washing. 24 The compact asks member
firms to "embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence,
a set of core values" '25 in the areas of human rights, labor standards,
the environment, 26 and anti-corruption. 27 The compact seeks to both
have companies adopt these principles and values as part of their busi-
17. See Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America, 23
NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 673, 674 (2009).
18. Id. at 675 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Michael Brune, executive director for the
Rainforest Action Network).
19. See id. at 675-76.
20. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure
Under Threat of Audit, 20 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 3, 4 (2011).
21. Less than 1% of British Petroleum's sales came from its solar division, and it spent ap-
proximately 600 times the amount of money to acquire an oil company than it did to acquire the
solar energy company Solarex. Vos, supra note 17, at 677.
22. See, e.g., David, M. Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social Constructivist Argument
Against Using Nike v. Kasky to Attack the UN Global Compact, J. INT'L LEGAL PERSP., Spring
2004, at 6; Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational
Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 25-26 (2007).
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of UN's "Public-Private" Partnership
for Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 147-48 (2006).
25. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.globalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
26. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human
Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos (Feb. 1, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.
27. This anti-corruption goal was added later. "Businesses should work against all forms of
corruption, including extortion and bribery." Transparency and Anti-Corruption, UNITED NA-
[Vol, 62:817
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ness strategy and operations, as well as encourage "co-operation and
collective problem-solving between different stakeholders. '' 28 Moreo-
ver, the compact utilizes policy dialogues among concerned stakehold-
ers; the dissemination of best practices; and the promotion of public-
private partnership projects.29 It quite explicitly rejects a vision of it-
self as a regulatory instrument. 30 Rather, the U.N. itself billed the
compact "not only as a business opportunity to gain and maintain
competitive advantage in market settings, but also as an important
strategy for risk management."'31
While finding plausible examples of green and blue washing is rela-
tively easy, no uniform definition of the practice exists. The origina-
tors of the term "green wash" left it to others to define.32 Scholars
like William Laufer have provided a typology of various green wash
strategies, 33 whereas others dismiss this typology as too broad and in-
stead define a wash as "the selective disclosure of positive information
TIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTENPrinciples/
anti-corruption.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
28. Georg Kell, The Global Compact. Origins, Operations, Progress, Challenges, 1 J. CORP.
CITIZENSHIP 35, 36 (2003).
29. See id. at 37-39.
30. It does not police, enforce or measure the behavior or actions of companies, nor does it
benchmark good and bad behavior. See Integrity Measures, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COM-
PACT, http://www.globalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2013).
31. Deva, supra note 24, at 125. While the compact relies largely on voluntary compliance
and public pressure, it did adopt a few enforcement mechanisms over time. First, the U.N. intro-
duced a complaint system into the compact. Stakeholders who submit what are deemed non-
frivolous complaints are entitled to a response from the allegedly infringing corporation that
details its efforts to address the substance of the complaint. See Integrity Measures, supra note
30. The Compact Office may also provide help to a company that wishes to remedy the source
of the complaint. See id. Second, companies found to endanger the reputation of the compact
or who fail to submit their annual report for two years may be expelled from the compact. See
id. In fact, the Compact Office has now started listing companies as "noncommunicating" if they
fail to submit a Communication on Progress (COP) within three years of joining the Global
Compact, or within two years of submitting their last COP. See 859 Companies Delisted for
Failure to Communicate on Progress, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (Feb. 1, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/8-02-01-2010. No independent verification of the
annual COP occurs.
32. See, e.g., JED GREER & KENNY BRUNO, GREENWASH: THE REALITY BEHIND CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1996).
33. See William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. Bus. ETH-
ics 253, 257 (2003). According to Laufer, greenwashing occurs in three basic forms: confusion,
fronting, and posturing.
Confusion flows naturally from the complex nature of the corporate form, reliance on
decentralized decision making, and the practices of managerial winking. Fronting is
accomplished through the representations of retained counsel, compliance officers, and
ethics officers and ethics communities. Posturing seeks to convince internal customers,
as much as external stakeholders, of the organization's collective commitment to ethics.
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about a company's environmental or social performance, while with-
holding negative information on these dimensions. ' 34 While these va-
rious definitions are helpful, none focus on the motivations for such
selective disclosure. Given the initial question posed about the influ-
ence of class action lawsuits (and law more generally) on corporate
behavior, a definition that more fully accounts for the role of law and
the importance of wrongdoing is needed.
B. Defining Extralegal Whitewashing
Before defining extralegal washing in detail, one must first under-
stand the context in which the practice occurs. Class actions and other
high-profile litigation have the potential to generate large legal fees,
damage a company's public reputation, disrupt corporate morale, and
result in expensive settlements or sanctions. Given the specter of such
a suit, companies may proactively create mechanisms to bolster legal
compliance and reduce the likelihood of a future viable claim. Using
gender washes as an example, such measures might include: creating
policies on sexual harassment; providing gender sensitivity training;
crafting internal grievance procedures; and reviewing and restructur-
ing hiring, promotion, transfer, firing, and pay policies to avoid legal
violations. Companies may also undertake efforts to repeal, weaken,
or prevent the legislation on which such litigation is premised. These
efforts could target gender through proposed amendments to Title
VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, or reach more broadly with anti-plaintiff legislation such as the
Class Action Fairness Act.
Even when companies undertake such actions, they may still be
presented with a legal claim to which they must then choose how to
respond. Their toolbox is quite extensive. Some lawful options in-
clude denying fault (with subsequent production of evidence and ex-
pert testimony) and leveraging procedural barriers to litigation
(fighting class certification, asserting a statute of limitations defense,
or alleging the failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 35 Those
companies unwilling to fight it out in court may also utilize some com-
bination of the following acts: an admission of fault, an apology, a
public or private settlement, the use of particular individuals as scape-
goats, and the deployment of cheap talk about its future good
behavior.
34. Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 5.
35. Less savory options can include obstruction of judicial process (by hiding, destroying, or
altering evidence).
[Vol. 62:817
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Companies that lose or settle must also decide how to behave at the
suit's conclusion. One could measure such post-suit behavior on a
compliance continuum. A maximally noncompliant company might
flout court orders providing redress to the plaintiffs, or disregard any
injunctions or terms of settlement agreements. A minimally compli-
ant company would eschew those approaches, but instead engage in
bare legal compliance with any court orders or settlement agreements.
In contrast, a robustly compliant company would both address indi-
vidual grievances and revamp institutional structures and practices to
exceed the legally required remedy.
While the literature on class actions' influence on corporate behav-
ior often focuses on the legal responses to the initiation of a suit and
the compliance choices faced at the conclusion of a suit, these do not
exhaust the universe of possible corporate responses. What I term
"extralegal washing" or "extralegal whitewashing" is an additional ap-
proach companies may use to address class action and other high-pro-
file lawsuits. 36 Extralegal washing is a type of a whitewash, a term
that, as I noted above, has been bandied about without much intellec-
tual precision. Thus, I want to start with the original concept of a
whitewash.
When used in the pejorative sense, whitewashing refers to the prac-
tice of using low-cost calcium paint to superficially conceal or cover up
a structural or substantive defect. 37 Although the painter knows of its
problems, a whitewashed wall appears flawless to the untrained eye.
Thus, as a conceptual matter, a whitewash has three essential compo-
nents: an underlying defect, an attempt to conceal the defect by di-
verting attention, and a failure to fix the underlying defect. By
extension, I define extralegal washing as (1) a wrongdoer's (2) deploy-
ment and publicity of policies and practices38 (3) in response to the
identification of a legal grievance, 39 (4) which does not address the
36. I want to emphasize "additional" because it bears mentioning that companies may decide
to deploy gender washing along with various other strategies identified above. For instance, a
company can both deny fault and engage in gender washing. Similarly, a company could choose
to admit fault; engage in noncompliance with the legal or moral norm; and attempt to deflect
attention with gender washing.
37. Whitewash might also be used in a non-pejorative sense. For instance, one might use
whitewash as a way of sprucing up a dirty, but otherwise unflawed structure. Take, for example,
the instance in which Tom Sawyer convinces his friends to pay for the privilege of whitewashing
Aunt Polly's fence. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER 14-15 (Univ. of Cal.
Press 1980) (1875).
38. Such policies are often, but need not be, gender friendly.
39. Gender washing could also occur in response to legislation, administrative regulation, or
other identification of a problem, but in this Article, I will focus on judicially instigated gender
washes.
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underlying concern of the aggrieved and (5) is intended to establish,
maintain, burnish, or restore institutional reputation. The remainder
of this Part further develops each component of this definition with a
few illustrative examples.
1. Predicate Behavior
As I define it, an extralegal wash first requires an entity to under-
take the wrongful action in question. 40 For our purposes, one relevant
type of wrongdoer is a corporate actor who engages in legally sanc-
tionable behavior. In this context, one must be careful to decouple
the factual existence of legal wrongdoing from the question of
whether an actor can or will be held responsible for a legal violation.
For instance, if a plaintiff waits too long to bring a suit for a discrimi-
natory hiring practice, she may not be able to successfully sue. How-
ever, if the company's practice was discriminatory at the time of the
employment decision, the company is still a wrongdoer for the pur-
poses of this analysis.
The whitewash concept may also include corporate actors who en-
gage in morally sanctionable behavior. One can imagine a company
violating a moral norm embodied in antidiscrimination law without
actually breaking the law. Such behavior can only spawn an extralegal
wash, though, if the law is invoked in some way to highlight the
wrongdoing. For example, a company might engage in behavior that
falls at the margin of sex discrimination, gender stereotyping, or
LGBTQ discrimination. Many courts reject these claims as a form of
sexual orientation bootstrapping under Title VII,41 but one may think
a moral norm against LGBTQ discrimination has emerged and the
law has simply failed to keep pace.42 Of course, not all actors who
engage in behavior at the margins of antidiscrimination law constitute
wrongdoers, and the determination of a wrongdoer can be deeply sub-
jective. The larger point is that if the law or society deems a com-
pany's behavior as wrong, that corporate actor has the potential to
engage in a whitewash.
As shown in the chart below, one may be a wrongdoer in numerous
ways-morally, legally, or both. That said, a purely legal wrongdoer
40. Although coating a wall in cheap paint is not necessarily wrong, if one does so after creat-
ing a defect that harms someone else, painting it so others cannot detect the flaw is wrong. In
this example, one could imagine the wrongdoer and the painter as separate, but so long as the
wrongdoer who allowed or created the defect employed the whitewasher, that activity is suffi-
cient for these purposes.
41. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1. 2-3 (1992).
42. See id. at 3.
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may not feel the need to undertake a wash; when an action is illegal,
but is not viewed as a moral wrong, other actors may not have a strong
negative response to such behavior. If people do not view the under-
lying grievance that serves as the basis for a lawsuit as legitimate,
reputational damage to the corporate actor may likely be insubstan-
tial. Conversely, the strongest case for a whitewash is when a corpo-
rate actor engages in both a legal and moral wrong. The law and legal
proceedings provide both a hook and a baseline by which wrongness
can be viewed and measured.
The behavior of corporate actors who are neither legal nor moral
wrongdoers is excluded. Many companies simply did not engage in
the alleged behavior. For other companies, the behavior they did en-
gage in is neither morally nor legally sanctionable. Such companies
may still choose to publicly deploy policies and practices to establish,
maintain, or restore institutional reputation. That said, I exclude
them as whitewashers because an attempt to address unjustified
reputational fallout or an attempt to improve reputation in the ab-
sence of wrongdoing does not inherently involve the element of
deception.
FIGURE 1: How LEGALITY AND MORALITY
INFLUENCE WHITEWASHES
MORAL WRONG No MORAL WRONG
Extralegal Wash Likely Extralegal Wash Possible
(probably not needed)
Example: firing of pregnant Example: failing to comply
LEGAL WRONG women because of belief with reporting requirements
that pregnant women should but satisfying substantive
not be in the workplace legal goals
Extralegal Wash Possible No Extralegal Wash
Example: sex stereotyping Example: voluntarily
against LGBTQ in enacting gender-friendly
No LEGAL WRONG jurisdictions that have company policy such as
rejected these claims designating a breast-feeding
room
2. Substantive Behavior
The second component of the extralegal whitewash definition-the
deployment and publicity of policies and practices-encompasses a
wide variety of activities. Broken down further by substantive area,
what makes a gender wash a specific type of whitewash, for instance,
is that the wrongdoing relates to gender, but the corporate behavior
undertaken in response to a gender grievance may, but need not, in-
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clude gender-specific policies and practices. Similarly, gender washing
policies may, but need not, be employment-related or targeted at the
company's workforce. Some examples of policies and practices that
might fall into this category include scholarships, 43 philanthropic do-
nations, 44 and emergency relief assistance. 45 Corporate actors could
easily and explicitly tie such policies and practices to gender. For in-
stance, a corporation could offer scholarships designated for female
recipients, sponsor the Susan G. Komen Race for the Cure, or provide
targeted assistance to female victims of national disasters. 46
It is important to briefly distinguish a whitewash from cheap talk.
Though the original concept of a whitewash involved cheap paint, the
concept of "cheap" is relative. In this context, many extralegal white-
washes might be financially expensive, but a company may decide that
undertaking such costs is "cheaper" than stoically suffering the repu-
tation hit from litigation. In contrast, economists define cheap talk as
a nonbinding and low-cost mechanism that actors use to signal infor-
mation to others.47 For our purposes, a corporate statement that "our
company cares about gender issues" can be cheap talk as it is inexpen-
sive to issue, does not commit a company to any specific course of
action, and may be designed to communicate something to an external
audience. Yet, a statement may also be sincere and unrelated to any
prior or perceived wrongdoing. In contrast, extralegal whitewashes
have no inherent limit on either cost or commitment level. Some gen-
der washes, such as sizable financial donations or initiatives for job
training for women in other countries, can be quite expensive. In ad-
dition, cheap talk is not inherently diversionary or deceptive whereas,
by definition, a gender wash is. For instance, that same corporate
statement mentioned above may simply convey a desire to take future
action without any diversionary or deceptive intent.
43. E.g., Associate Scholarships, WALMART CORPORATE, http://foundation.walmart.com/our-
focus/education (last visited Feb. 5, 2013)..
44. E.g., Our Focus, WALMART CORPORATE, http://foundation.walmart.com/our-focus (last
visited Feb. 5, 2013).
45. E.g., Special Interests, WALMART CORPORATE, http://foundation.walmart.com/our-focus/
special-interests (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
46. While this Article discusses some corporate social responsibility initiatives at length, not
all corporate social responsibility initiatives are extralegal whitewashes, and not all extralegal
whitewashes include corporate social responsibility initiatives.
47. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 103
(describing conditions under which cheap talk can be value adding).
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3. Causation Requirement
The third component-a response to the identification of a legal
grievance-serves as a limiting factor by adding a causation require-
ment to the whitewash definition. I will provide some factors one
might use to distinguish causation from mere correlation or coinci-
dence. Because "extralegal whitewashing" is a concept, rather than a
legal standard, a more relaxed method of determining causation than
those deployed in lawsuits is appropriate. Thus, rather than provide a
bright line, I suggest some non-exhaustive factors that might serve as
strong proxies for causation.
Direct knowledge or non-self-interested indication of intent, such as
internal communications documenting the cause and effect relation-
ship, are, of course, highly probative. Internal communications that
are not meant to be viewed by the public are particularly compelling
because the authors have greater reasons for candor. In the absence
of such "smoking guns," one might look to proximity in time to high-
stake or high-publicity, lawsuit-related activity.48 For instance, one
might expect to see such efforts timed near a decision to certify a
class, to deny a motion for summary judgment, or at the conclusion of
a lawsuit.
Another relevant factor is whether the activity in question is a sig-
nificant departure from previous policies in either scope, scale, or ap-
proach. If a company has a long-standing policy of making a sizable
donation to a different charity each year, the announcement of the
annual donation going to a gender-specific charity when the company
is facing a gender lawsuit might be an attempt to gender wash, but it
also might reflect a decision made prior to the suit or a mere coinci-
dence. Relatedly, if a company has an institutional policy of making
changes or new policies at regular intervals, that may also undermine
a determination of gender washing. For instance, if a company en-
gages in five-year reviews of employment practices and that review
occurs during a pending lawsuit, the result of the review may or may
not be influenced by the lawsuit.
It is worth cautioning that corporate actors often have numerous,
overlapping reasons to adopt changes; the desire to deceive or distract
need not be the company's sole motivating factor in an extralegal
whitewash. Just as one might whitewash a fence to both deceive po-
tential buyers and please the current owner, the fact that additional
benefits may accrue from washing does not render it a non-deceitful
48. While proximity can be important, one should remember that if a lawsuit is extensive
enough, any corporate action will seem close in time to some portion of the suit.
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or non-diversionary action. As long as such a goal is a substantial or
significant motivating factor for the behavior, that is sufficient.
4. Remedial Requirement
The fourth requirement-that the company's policy does not ad-
dress the underlying concern of the aggrieved-distinguishes extrale-
gal washing from robust compliance with legal or moral norms. A
company may choose to remedy an underlying grievance as a wholly
voluntary matter prior to the initiation of a lawsuit, as part of a settle-
ment, or as part of a court order. This may, but need not, include the
provision of the exact remedy that the aggrieved individuals sought.
As an easy example, if a plaintiff alleges that the company standards
for setting pay across departments creates sex-based disparities, and
the company changes those standards to eliminate the disparity, such
action need not constitute a gender wash even if the company chooses
different standards than those requested by the plaintiffs. If corporate
behavior acknowledges the legitimacy of the aggrieved plaintiffs' com-
plaint and takes action to remedy it, then it is not an extralegal white-
wash. In contrast, if plaintiffs make the same argument about pay
standards and the company responds by instituting day care facilities
at the workplace, that behavior might constitute a gender wash be-
cause the change in policies fails to address the problematic pay dis-
parity. Thus, determining whether this factor is met requires a close
comparison between the plaintiffs' specific complaint and the com-
pany's subsequent behavior.
5. Reputational Intent Requirement
Lastly, a company's policies and practices must intend to establish,
maintain, or restore its institutional reputation. The new policies or
practices must be intended, at least in part, to garner positive atten-
tion that will divert publicity away from the underlying grievance.
Thus, I suggest extralegal whitewashing is most likely to occur when
litigation threatens a company's reputation. The reputation issue can
arise for a variety of reasons: the litigation may garner widespread
public attention; spark interest on behalf of regulators; or be revealed
to a discrete but important audience, such as the company's own em-
ployees or investors.
As mentioned earlier, both companies 49 and the media 50 are paying
increased attention to reputation and managing reputation risk. Rep-
49. See, e.g., TONELLO, supra note 13, at 5.
50. SHANDWICK, supra note 12, at 1.
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FIGURE 2: WHEN POLICIES CAN CONSTITUTE A WHITEWASH
ADDRESS AGGRIEVED'S NOT ADDRESS AGGRIEVED'S
CONCERN CONCERN
No Wash No Wash
Example: not acknowledging
Example: acknowledging fault fault and eliminating
POLICY THAT and eliminating discretion in discretion for supervisors on a
AGGRIEVED REQUESTED setting pay in response to class number of issues including
action concerning pay ability to set pay in response
discrimination to class action concerning pay
discrimination
No Wash Wash Possible
Example: acknowledging fault
and providing instructions to Example: creating generous
DIFFERENT POLICY THAN those with guidance on how to maternity leave policy in
AGGRIEVED REQUESTED avoid discriminatory pay response to class actiondecisions in response to class concerning pay discrimination
action concerning pay
discrimination
utation is a broad concept that encompasses varied relationships and
perceptions by different audiences. Those audiences can be internal,
such as employees and stockholders, or external, such as customers,
suppliers, credit rating agencies, and regulators.
Unfortunately, divining the intent of a corporation can be difficult.
Thus, I suggest using publicity as a proxy for intent to affect reputa-
tion. In order to satisfy the intent requirement, these new policies and
practices must also be visible to a relevant audience. If a company
undertakes gender-friendly policies and practices, but they are not de-
signed to allow anyone to perceive those policies, such behavior sim-
ply does not constitute a gender wash. As described earlier, the
essence of a whitewash is to conceal or divert attention from an un-
derlying defect. Corporate actors generally do not enact low visibility
policies or practices to divert or forestall other action aimed at reme-
dying the structural grievance. 51
That said, visibility merely requires perception by the relevant audi-
ence, not by all people. The audience for the gender wash might be
external, internal, or both. Companies possess a variety of tools to
make such policies and practices visible: advertisements, press re-
leases, and contributions and initiatives large enough that the press
will independently take notice.
51. Of course, one could imagine a corporate actor that wishes the policy and practice to be
invisible, but the outcome to be visible. For instance, one might engage in sex discrimination
against men to increase the number of women in a corporation, but, for obvious reasons, a
company would keep quiet about such practices. Even though the company might appear to
have a more diverse work force, I would not label this as a gender wash.
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FIGURE 3: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN VISIBILITY AND POLICY IN
CREATING A WHITEWASH
VISIBLE INVISIBLE
Wash Possible No Wash
Example: report on women's Example: internal report on
issues in the workplace that women's issues in the
is disseminated among workplace that is kept
GENDER-SPECIFIC POLICY/ employees and the public confidential
PRACTICE
Specific recommended Specific recommended
policies are taken and policies are quietly
publicized undertaken
Wash Possible No Wash
Example: announcement of
disaster relief at press Example: anonymousNoN-GENDER-SPECIFIC conference and delivery of donation to disaster relief
POLECYIPRACTICE disaster relief supplies in program
company-branded vehicles
III. CASE STUDY: WAL-MART'S ALLEGED GENDER WASH
This Part investigates Wal-Mart's behavior during the Dukes sex
discrimination litigation to contextualize a potential gender wash.
Wal-Mart makes a particularly valuable case study for several reasons.
Given Wal-Mart's status as the largest private employer in the United
States,52 its employment practices directly affect over 1% of the
American workforce. 53 Its size, market position, and resources also
allow for Wal-Mart to launch a highly visible whitewashing campaign
should it choose to do so. In addition, many business management
scholars and consultants laud Wal-Mart for its highly successful busi-
ness model and corporate practices. Thus, one might expect other
companies to borrow or emulate Wal-Mart's strategies. 54 Moreover,
many feminists and public commentators have accused Wal-Mart of
gender washing in the wake of the highly contentious Dukes litigation.
Yet such criticisms often lack significant analysis of what makes such
practices objectionable. This Part seeks to provide a more rigorous
assessment of how Wal-Mart's behavior might constitute an extralegal
whitewash.
Before describing and assessing Wal-Mart's alleged gender washing,
however, one must first identify the grievance that serves as the predi-
52. See Marion G. Boarnet et al., Emerging Planning Challenges in Retail: The Case of Wal-
Mart, 71 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 433, 433 (2005).
53. See Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 355, 386 (2006).
Moreover, its ongoing international expansion adds a global reach to its employment behavior.
54. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart and the New World Order: A Template for Twenty-First
Century Capitalism?, NEW LAB. F., Spring 2005, at 21, 22.
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cate condition for the whitewash. In this instance, the Dukes plaintiffs
identified and raised a gender-related grievance by pursuing a sex dis-
crimination class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a class,
women in hourly positions "(1) are paid less than men in comparable
positions, despite having higher performance ratings and greater se-
niority; and (2) receive fewer-and wait longer for-promotions to in-
store management positions than men."' 55 Plaintiffs' experts con-
ducted a statistical analysis showing that women in hourly positions
made significantly less per year than did similarly situated male em-
ployees. 56 They also submitted evidence showing that women com-
prise the vast majority of the lowest paid workers and a significant
majority of hourly workers, while they fill only a third of all manage-
rial positions. 57 The gender gap widens as one moves further up the
managerial chain. 58 The plaintiffs contended that such numbers are
particularly troubling in a company with an over 70% within-store
promotion policy, which is consequently drawing from a largely fe-
male labor pool. 59
The plaintiffs' claim has both a legal and a moral component-Wal-
Mart's alleged violation of Title VII's antidiscrimination prohibitions
and Wal-Mart's treatment and valuation of its female employees. This
moral concern suggests that many might find the alleged behavior of
Wal-Mart, and its corporate culture, problematic and worthy of sub-
stantial reform regardless of whether such behavior is found to for-
mally violate Title VII. For the purposes of this Article, however, if
an accurate rendering of the facts would lead the target audience of
55. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
56. See Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Faces Lawsuit over Sex Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2003, at A22 (noting that women earned $1,150 less per year than similarly situated
men).
57. Declaration of Richard Drogin Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certifica-
tion at 9-10, 13, 14 tbl.7, 16 tbl.9, 17 tbl.10, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ) [hereinafter Drogin Declaration]. As the plaintiffs submitted in
Drogin's declaration, the percentages for female staff members in salaried positions are as fol-
lows: Store Manager-14%; Co-Manager (only in larger stores)-23%; Assistant Manager-
36%. For female staff members in hourly positions, the percentages were markedly higher:
Management Trainee-42%; Support Manager-50%; Department Manager-78%; Customer
Service Manager-85-90%; Other hourly positions-70%. For a more detailed statistical analy-
sis, see Drogin Declaration, supra.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also William T. Bielby, Applying Social
Research on Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias to Employment Discrimination Litigation: The Case
of Allegations of Systematic Gender Bias at Wal-Mart Stores, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 395, 396-97 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Rob-
ert L. Nelson eds., 2005).
59. Drogin Declaration, supra note 57, at 25 ("Wal-Mart has a strong 'promote from within'
policy, as shown by its statement that '72% of all Salaried Management started as hourly
Associates.'").
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Wal-Mart's potentially gender washing behavior to believe that Wal-
Mart is a wrongdoer, and therefore its behavior needs changing, that
belief suffices to constitute a gender-related grievance.
It bears emphasis that the mere existence of a grievance does not
equate to the existence of a wrongdoer; plaintiffs may simply be incor-
rect in either, or both, their legal and moral contentions. The question
of whether Wal-Mart is actually a wrongdoer in terms of its employ-
ment practices is a hard one. To reach a legal answer, one must re-
solve complicated doctrinal, evidentiary, and statistical issues. After
many years, courts are still in the midst of this morass. Reaching a
moral judgment may depend on the legal answer, and even for those
whom it does not, the question of whether Wal-Mart engaged in sys-
tematic bad behavior and who should be held to account for that be-
havior is similarly fraught with peril. One would have to decide the
company's moral responsibility for a situation that might be character-
ized either as a few bad apples or a thoroughly rotten barrel. But to
the extent that one is willing to presume that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs
presented a legitimate legal or moral grievance and that Wal-Mart is a
wrongdoer, 60 this Part seeks to assess whether Wal-Mart might satisfy
the other criteria for a gender wash.
A. Potential Gender Washing Policies
Wal-Mart initiated several potential gender washing policies and
practices in the shadow of the Dukes class action litigation. This Part
identifies and reviews several of the most high-profile actions, includ-
ing increases in gender diversity in executive and board membership,
additions to the organizational structure that focus on gender diver-
sity, and the creation of a massive initiative to empower female work-
ers and female owned businesses. All of the identified policies are
explicitly tied to gender and seem to represent departures in either
size or kind from pre-litigation practices. Yet none of these policies
explicitly address the underlying complaint of the Dukes plaintiffs-
that low-level female employees experienced widespread discrimina-
tion in pay and promotion.
1. Executive, Organizational, and Board-Level Behavior
After the initiation of the Dukes litigation, one major set of changes.
involved the gender composition of Wal-Mart's executive leadership
and board membership. Although the Dukes litigation focused on the
60. Such a presumption might be based on evidence presented and assessed elsewhere or
engaged in simply as an intellectual exercise.
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promotion of female employees, it did not allege sex discrimination in
the most senior executive positions. Interestingly, though, when
plaintiffs filed Dukes in 2000, no women served as senior officers of
Wal-Mart. 61 While the changes in gender composition of executive
positions have been uneven,62 2012 saw the promotion of three
women to very high-level positions,63 and seven of thirty-one senior
officers are now women. In addition, for the first time in Wal-Mart's
history, female CEOs head Wal-Mart Canada and the associated dis-
count retailer Sam's Club.64 The nature of these positions renders
them quite visible to employees, shareholders, and the business com-
munity at large. Moreover, Wal-Mart has actively touted the promo-
tion of these women as evidence that Wal-Mart's internal processes
succeed in creating, identifying, and promoting talent.65
In addition to these changes in high-level positions, Wal-Mart cre-
ated a few organizational structures with the ostensible goal of pro-
moting the advancement of women within the company. In 2003,
three years after six plaintiffs filed Dukes and within months of plain-
tiffs filing for class action certification,66 Wal-Mart created the office
of diversity.67 This office acts as a focal point for all of Wal-Mart's
diversity initiatives, which range from employment practices to sup-
61. See WALMART, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net
media-files/irol/11/112761/ARs/2000_annualreport.pdf.
62. See WALMART, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/
media files/irol/1/112761/ARs/2009AnnualReport.pdf; WALMART, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT
(2008), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/11/112761/ARs/2008_Annual_
Report.pdf; WALMART, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 14-15 (2007), available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media-files/irol/11/112761/ARs/2007-annual-report.pdf; WALMART, 2006 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 52 (2006), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/11/112761/ARs/2006-
annual-report.pdf; WALMART, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2005), available at http://media.corpo-
rate-ir.net/media-files/irol/ll/112761/ARs/2005AnnualReport.pdf; WALMART, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT (2004), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/11/112761/ARs/annu-
alreport_2004.pdf.
63. Walmart Announces Senior Management Changes and Promotions, WALMART CORPO-
RATE (Jan. 20, 2012), http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/investors/walmart-announces-se-
nior-management-changes-promotions-1650942 (announcing the promotion of Rosalind Brewer
to president and CEO of Sam's Club, Gisel Ruiz to executive VP and COO for Wal-Mart, and
Karenann Terrell to CIO as evidence that Wal-Mart's succession and management development
programs work). Notably, Rosalind Brewer was the first chairperson of the Wal-Mart Presi-
dent's Council of Global Women Leaders. Id.
64. WALMART, 2011 DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION REPORT 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 DIVER-
SITY AND INCLUSION REPORT], available at http://www.walmartstores.com/Diversity/305.aspx.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Press Release, Walmart Class Website, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Timeline: A Decade of
Pre-Trial Litigation in America's Largest Sex Discrimination Case (Mar. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/mar29brief/llWM%2Case%20Timeline%20329%2Fi-
nal%20_2-.pdf.
67. See Walmart Office of Diversity, YENRA (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www.yenra.comwalmart-
office-of-diversity.
2013]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
plier relations to community outreach. 68 The office's 2010 and 2011
annual diversity and inclusion documents emphasized the number of
female managers and officers. 69 The 2011 document also boasted that
Wal-Mart exceeded both the retail and Fortune 500 average with its
percentages of women employed in the workforce, in executive posi-
tions, and on the board. 70 Not surprisingly, the documents do not pro-
vide information on women's salaries, a comparison of promotion
rates for women and men within the company, or any information
about the gender pool from which Wal-Mart makes promotions.
Another set of new practices involves the institutionalization of
groups for female mentoring and gender issues. In 2009, as Wal-Mart
waited for the Ninth Circuit's en banc review of class certification, 71
freshly minted CEO Michael Duke kicked off his appointment by cre-
ating the President's Global Council of Women Leaders. 72 He tasked
this group with helping to develop and advance women into upper
level management positions within the company.73 The fourteen-
member council, staffed with one woman from each of Wal-Mart's
global markets,74 meets monthly to discuss issues facing females at
Wal-Mart. 75 Wal-Mart has also formed similar groups at lower levels,
which include the Women's Officer Caucus and the Women's Re-
source Council.76 Groups such as Working Mother Media, Latina
Style, and the National Association for Female Executives have all
praised these initiatives.77 Yet none of these institutional groups have
squarely addressed the problem of advancement at the lowest levels
68. Id.
69. WALMART, 2010 DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION REPORT 4 (2010), available at http://www.
diversityinc.com/legal-issues/our-guide-to-coverage-of-the-walmart-court-decision; 2011 DIVER-
SITY AND INCLUSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 5. The 2010 document does not provide a com-
parison to men or a number or rate of increase as compared to past years, though the 2011
document provides such evidence.
70. 2011 DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 3.
71. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 613 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also
Press Release, supra note 66.
72. Matthew Boyle, Wal-Mart Vows to Promote Women, BuSINESSWEEK (June 5,2009), http://
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/Jun2009/db2009065_679455.htm (noting that
Duke built upon a similar informal council that he employed when he ran Wal-Mart's interna-
tional operations).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Grace Sanchez, How Has Mike Duke, Walmart's CEO, Helped Women Leaders at
Walmart?, MGMT. MENTORS (Dec. 3, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.management-mentors.com/
about/corporate-mentoring-matters-blog/bid/51966/How-Has-Mike-Duke-Walmart-s-CEO-
Helped-Women-Leaders-At-Walmart.
76. 2011 DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 14.
77. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://www.2020wob.comlcompanies/
w-spotlight/wal-mart-stores-inc (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
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of the associate ranks. 78 Nor is there any public evidence that these
groups consider structural constraints such as the relocation policies
or the role of bias in decision making. 79 Rather, these groups seem to
be focused on increasing female mentorship, networking, and
competencies.
In addition, while awaiting the Supreme Court's decision on class
certification, 0 Wal-Mart began sponsoring the "20% by 2020 initia-
tive." This initiative seeks to achieve 20% female representation on
corporate boards by the year 2020.81 The organization provides a
searchable database that ranks companies as winning, very close, to-
ken membership, or zero based on their adherence to the target
20%.82 With three females serving as part of its fifteen-member
board, Wal-Mart met its 2012 target goal and has been ranked as a
"winning" company. 3 Given two females were already serving on the
board in 2000, membership did not require much change.84 Nor does
the board set or have any direct influence over female associates' sal-
ary, promotion, or other policies that might encourage or hinder their
advancement. It probably goes without saying that the "20 by 2020"
initiative has no accompanying percentage benchmarks for hourly and
low-level managerial positions.
2. Global Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative
In terms of both scope and expense, the recently launched Global
Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative is Wal-Mart's most sig-
nificant new policy. 5 Wal-Mart announced this multibillion dollar ec-
78. The women's resource council has 2,200 members, but has only just begun to involve
hourly workers. See Betty Spence, NAFE Top 50: The Sweetest Success, WORKING MOTHER,
http://www.workingmother.com/best-companies/nafe-top-50-sweetest-success (last visited Feb. 5,
2013).
79. Wal-Mart is notoriously tight-lipped about its employment practices, thus such lack of
evidence ought not be taken as definitive proof that Wal-Mart is not changing its ways.
80. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571. 613 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also
Press Release, supra note 66.
81. About Us, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://www.2020wob.com/about (last visited Feb. 5,
2013).
82. Learn, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://www.2020wob.com/learn (last visited Feb. 5,
2013).
83. Gender Diversity Directory, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://www.2020wob.com/com-
pany-directory?company=wal&city=&women on board=&sector=All&state=All&rating= (last
visited Feb. 5, 2013).
84. WALMART STORES, INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS (2000), avail-
able at http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/11/112761/ARs/2000_proxy.pdf.
85. On a much smaller scale, Wal-Mart also undertakes purely domestic programs to provide
similar assistance locally. In 2009, along with the organization Dress for Success, Wal-Mart co-
sponsored a pilot program to provide unemployed women with "professional skills, accelerate
their job search and build confidence through weekly training sessions, one-on-one career coach-
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onomic plan, which aspires to empower female workers and female-
owned businesses, in September 2011.86 This announcement was
made a mere three months after the Supreme Court rejected a nation-
wide class certification in Dukes, and during the period in which state-
wide classes were forming. The initiative joins Wal-Mart with some
well-respected NGOs such as CARE, Vital Voices, and Count Me In.
By the end of 2016, Wal-Mart aims to achieve five major goals
through this initiative: (1) sourcing $20 billion from women-owned
American businesses, as well as doubling its sourcing from interna-
tional female suppliers; (2) providing 60,000 women working in facto-
ries with training, market access, and career opportunities; (3) helping
200,000 low-income women in America pursue higher education and
learn job skills; (4) offering retail training programs to 200,000 women
worldwide; and (5) increasing female and minority representation in
service firms and suppliers.87 Wal-Mart plans on providing $100 mil-
lion in grants drawn from the Wal-Mart Foundation and Wal-Mart's
international businesses 88 to organizations that support women's eco-
nomic development.89 Wal-Mart claims that this initiative will help
over 450,000 women globally. 90
The initiative both creates wholly new programs and builds on ex-
isting efforts. For instance, Wal-Mart is in the process of launching a
new e-commerce site that features items made by small, female-
owned businesses and female artisans. 91 The e-commerce program
ing and networking in a supportive environment." NICK COPELAND & CHRISTINE LABUSKI, THE
WORLD OF WAL-MART: DISCOUNTING THE AMERICAN DREAM 49 (2013). After the pilot pro-
gram's success, Wal-Mart initiated the Going Places Network, a skills enhancement course, now
available in sixty affiliate locations. See Walmart Offers $2M to Dress for Success, LEBANON
DAILY NEWS, Sep. 8,2011. In addition, in March 2011, the Wal-Mart Foundation made a sizable
monetary and in-kind donation to Dress for Success. This $2 million grant is the single largest
that Dress For Success has ever received. Audrey J. Bernard, Audrey's Society Whirl: Over 1,000
Attend Dress for Success Gala, ELECTRONIC URBAN REPORT (April 24, 2012), http://www.
eurweb.com/2012/04/audreys-society-whirl-over-1000-attend-dress-for-success-gala.
86. Walmart Launches Global Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative, WALMART COR-
PORATE (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/10692.aspx.
87. See id.
88. Andrea Chang, Wal-Mart Announces Women-Friendly Initiatives, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 15,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/15/business/la-fi-walmart-women-20110915.
89. Walmart Aims to Help Women Live Better, MASS MARKET RETAILERS (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.massmarketretailers.com/inside-this-issue/news/10-03-2011 /walmart-aims-to-help-
women-live-better.
90. Laurie Whalen, Retailer Focus on Helping Women, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Sept. 15, 2011, http://m.arkansasonline.com/news/2011/sep/l5/retailer-focus-helping-women-
20110915.
91. Walmart Announces Launch of E-Commerce Empowerment Solution for Women Around
the Globe, WEB NEWSWIRE (Mar. 30, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.webnewswire.com/node/
1089745 (hoping that the site will reach women who cannot produce enough to sell in physical
stores).
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claims to provide women with "the benefit of the company's knowl-
edge about customers, packaging and promotions. '92 Wal-Mart is also
expanding its existing Indian joint venture, 93 which seeks to provide
sustainable employment opportunities to economically vulnerable
women. 94 Since its launch in 2009, Bharti Wal-Mart has trained over
2,000 women, and women now comprise 18% of its workforce. 95 Such
efforts should be accelerated and expanded under the new initiative.
In addition, other new programs under the auspices of the global initi-
ative include the Best Price Members Women's Council, which hopes
to address problems facing female entrepreneurs trying to work with
Bharti Wal-Mart by providing training and greater access to domestic
and global markets, and disseminating Wal-Mart's best practices at
supplier meets.96 Similar efforts to meet the initiative's ambitious
goals are also underway in Central America 97 and China.98
The Global Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative has drawn
media attention, as well as praise from the highest levels. For in-
stance, Melanne Verveer, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Global
Women's Issues, hailed the effort as a potential "game-changer." 99
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also supported the initia-
tive100 by teaming up with Wal-Mart under the International Fund for
92. Id. (quoting Leslie Dach, Wal-Mart's executive vice president of corporate affairs).
93. Wal-Mart entered the Indian market in 2007 and opened its first store in 2009 with Bharti.
Our Locations: India, WALMART CORPORATE, http://www.walmartstores.com/AboutUs/276.aspx
(last visited Feb. 5, 2013). This joint venture emerged from a collaborative partnership between
the company, government, NGOs, charities, and academics. Press Release, Bharti, Bharti
Walmart Enters South India (Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.bharti.com/home/media-
centre/press-releases/fy20l1-2012/bharti+Walmart+enters+south+india.
94. Bharti Wal-Mart's ongoing projects include: implementing the Cashew Value Chain Initia-
tive, which creates opportunities for women to improve their literacy skills and acquire training
in cashew processing; four free retail training centers; training of female village farmers from
whom Wal-Mart will source products; and adopting schools to improve the quality of education.
Bharti Walmart Launches Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative in India, INDIA PR WIRE
(Sept. 18, 2011), http:lwww.indiaprwire.comlpressrelease/other/2011091597788.htm.
95. Id.
96. See Bharti Walmart Launches "Best Price Members Women's Council", INDIA INFOLINE
NEWS SERVICE (May 15, 2012), http://beta.indiainfoline.com/Markets/News/Bharti-Walmart-
launches-Best-Price-Members-Womens-Council/5417528193.
97. Walmart Launches Global Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative, supra note 86.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Walmart Statement Regarding Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's Remarks at
Today's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Women and the Economy Summit, PR NEWSWIRE
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/walmart-statement-regarding-secre-
tary-of-state-hillary-rodham-clintons-remarks-at-todays-asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-
women-and-the-economy-summit-129972623.html.
2013]
840 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:817
Women and Grants to create small grants for women throughout Cen-
tral and Latin America. 10
In shaping the narrative about the Global Women's Economic Em-
powerment Initiative, Wal-Mart has seemingly distanced itself from
the Dukes lawsuit, 10 2 emphasized its concern for women, and at-
tempted to be relevant to them.10 3 In discussing the initiative, CEO
Mike Duke commented, "Helping more women live better is a defin-
ing issue for our business and our world. '10 4 While the initiative in-
cludes some domestic efforts, it continues to sidestep claims that
women cannot advance at Wal-Mart stores and are paid less than their
male counterparts. 10 5 The initiative also fails to train managers to be
sensitive to sex discrimination or to focus on the role of pay raises and
promotion. 0 6 Instead, the initiative emphasizes the need of women to
receive job training and access to markets. This initiative is self-con-
sciously about helping women help themselves, not about ensuring the
equitable treatment of female employees.
101. Walmart, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Inter-American Development
Bank Partner to Change the Lives of Women and Youth, WALMART CORPORATE (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/10869.aspx.
102. Jenna Goudreau, Wal-Mart to 'Empower' Women?, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/jennagoudreau/2011/09/14/wal-mart-to-empower-women.
103. Walmart Aims to Help Women Live Better, supra note 89. CEO Mike Duke has been
explicit in his purpose, stating, "We want women to view us as a retailer that is relevant to them
and cares about them. We want them to be leading suppliers, managers and loyal customers."
Id.
104. Goudreau, supra note 102.
105. See Stephanie Clifford & Stephanie Strom, Wal-Mart to Announce Women-Friendly
Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/business/wal-mart-to-an-
nounce-women-friendly-plans.html?_r=l&scp=2&sq=walmart&st=cse. AFL-CIO's Janet Shenk
says this initiative is merely a way to divert attention from the lawsuit, and believes it will not do
much to empower women: "Once again, Wal-Mart is avoiding every issue that touches on how
its products are produced .... It's not about who owns the factory. So far as I know, there's no
evidence that factories and businesses owned by women treat their employees better or have
better conditions than factories and businesses owned by men." Id.
106. See Martha Burk, Gender Washing at Walmart, HUFFINOTON POST (Sept. 15, 2011, 7:06
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martha-burk/gender-washing-at-walmart-b-964942.html.
Wal-Mart hired Sylvia Burwell, former president of global development at the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, to be the president of Walmart Foundation and lead the Global Women's
Economic Empowerment Initiative. Walmart Foundation Gets Leader from Gates' Group,
REUTERS, Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2011/10/14/us-walmart-foundation-idUS-
TRE79DOJW20111014. While Burwell has focused on many admirable philanthrophic deeds,
nothing in her impressive resume suggests any experience or commitment to combating employ-
ment discrimination. Cf Walmart Foundation Names New President, WALMART CORPORATE
(Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/10727.aspx.
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3. General Reputation-Enhancing Behavior
Given Wal-Mart's various legal troubles, it is not surprising that it
might feel the need to engage in reputation-enhancing activities. In
the last ten years, Wal-Mart has undertaken a number of social initia-
tives and actions that suggest good corporate citizenship. A quick pe-
rusal of its website reveals the diversity in Wal-Mart's social
investment: a $2 billion in-kind commitment to help end hunger in the
United States;10 7 a significant environmental initiative that includes
intensive guidelines for its suppliers;10 8 various scholarship and educa-
tion grants;10 9 initiatives with particular emphasis on minority, immi-
grant, and veteran recipients;110  and donations to local and
international disaster relief with a leading role in helping those af-
fected by Hurricane Katrina."' Though the Wal-Mart Foundation is a
long-standing institution, Wal-Mart tripled its domestic philanthropic
giving between 2007 and 2011.112
In addition, one might view the 2009 appointment of CEO Mike
Duke as another overarching, reputation-enhancing move. Wal-Mart
insiders suggest that Duke's skills in talent development and his po-
tential to improve the company's record on diversity may have led to
his edging out other competitors for the job.11 3 Duke has spoken
openly about Wal-Mart's determination to "be the best possible place
for women to work,"'1 14 and he is responsible for the Global Women's
Economic Empowerment Initiative, as well as many of the institu-
tional changes described above. He has even received a "Hall of
Fame" prize from a major women's group for his diversity efforts. 1 5
107. Hunger Relief & Healthy Eating, WALMART CORPORATE, http://www.walmartstores.com/
CommunityGiving/9599.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
108. See Jayne Jung, As Wal-Mart Greens, INST. INVESTOR, Apr. 2012, at 34, 36-37, 72.
109. Associate Scholarships, supra note 43.
110. Veterans & Military Families, WALMART CORPORATE, http://www.walmartstores.com/
CommunityGiving/216.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013); Our Communities, WALMART CORPO-
RATE, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/diversity-inclusion/our-communities
(last visited Feb. 5, 2013); Our Suppliers, WALMART CORPORATE, http://corporate.walmart.com/
global-responsibility/diversity-inclusion/our-suppliers (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
111. Media Information: Wal-Mart's Response to Hurricane Katrina, WALMART CORPORATE,
http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2005/09/04/media-information-wal-marts-response-to-
hurricane-katrina (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
112. Peter Dreier & Donald Cohen, Wal-Mart's Honest Graft, DISSENT (June 21, 2012), http://
207.97.238.133/online.php?id=614.
113. Boyle, supra note 72; Walmart Aims to Help Women Live Better, supra note 89.
114. Walmart Aims to Help Women Live Better, supra note 89.
115. See Amy Tennery, Walmart's Women Deception: How a Retail Giant Made Everyone
Think It's 'Lady-Friendly', JANE DOUGH (July 5, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.thejanedough.com/
walmart-ceo-award.
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B. Continued Wrongdoing
As described above, not all gender-friendly or otherwise reputation-
enhancing policies constitute a gender wash; they require the com-
pany's simultaneous failure to remedy the underlying grievance.
While a full exploration of whether Wal-Mart continues to engage in
sex discrimination is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief descrip-
tion of the underlying policies at issue is necessary. In Dukes and the
subsequent California and Texas employment class actions, the liti-
gants alleged that a variety of specific policies and practices were re-
sponsible for discrimination, including:
the lack of a consistent job posting, the requirement of relocation as
a condition of entry into and promotion through management, reli-
ance on stereotypes in making pay and promotion decisions, lack of
objective criteria for making promotion decisions, and lack of con-
sistent and reliable scheduling for management level employees. 116
Rather than determine whether these alleged policies were and are
still in place, 117 the point of this Article is to identify what actions, if
engaged in, would constitute a gender wash.
Importantly, Wal-Mart has never acknowledged any corporate re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing with regard to the Dukes litigation. But
even without acknowledging wrongdoing, Wal-Mart could have
changed or eliminated the underlying policies and practices that ag-
grieve the plaintiffs. A very preliminary investigation, however, sug-
gests that Wal-Mart has kept at least some of these practices in place.
For instance, as of late 2011, it appears that Wal-Mart was still utilizing
116. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 13-14, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252-CRB (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011). Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand at 2-3, Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-02954-O (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 19, 2012).
117. Moreover, Wal-Mart is notoriously tight-lipped about its employment policies. Michael
J. Myers, Wal-Mart, Shopko Cart Gathering: A Case for Smith v. City of Jackson ADEA Dispa-
rate Impact?, 8 MARO. ELDER'S ADVISOR 91, 91-94 (2006) (detailing internal memos directing
supervisors that every position must have a physical component in order to justify hiring younger
workers, which would lower health care and other costs). Without the underlying lawsuit, we
might not even know that these practices existed. Wal-Mart executives dismissed the signifi-
cance of a 2000 in-house audit that revealed extensive violations of labor laws. The report was
sealed by the court and managers reported that upper management never pushed store manag-
ers to prevent further violations. See Steven Greenhouse, In-House Audit Says Wal-Mart Vio-
lated Labor Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/13/uslin-house-
audit-says-wal-mart-violated-labor-laws.html; cf Ritu Bhatnagar, Dukes v. Wal-Mart As a Cata-
lyst for Social Activism, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 246, 251 (2004) ("The plaintiffs' attorneys
for Dukes have stated that they hope that the lawsuit.., will also begin to penetrate other labor
practices, such as comparatively low wages, the denial of overtime pay, and the prevention of
collective bargaining.").
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the relocation requirement. 118 Additionally, Wal-Mart has long had
an official policy explicitly requiring the posting of jobs in stores, but
the original Dukes plaintiffs alleged that nearly 80% were not posted.
Whether that figure is accurate or this has improved since the filing of
the lawsuit is an open question. At least some testimony during the
original Dukes litigation suggests that no one was tasked with moni-
toring the enforcement of this policy even after the lawsuit began. 119
In contrast, starting in 2000, Wal-Mart asked its district managers to
set diversity "goals" for the advancement of women in management.
These goals were based on each manager's subjective views on what
was attainable and were not tied to any objective measures of availa-
bility or qualifications. Yet the newly filed California and Texas law
suits allege that prior to 2004, failure to meet diversity goals had no
financial or other consequence for managers, and that many store
managers were unaware of the existence of any diversity goals.120
All that said, Wal-Mart has increased its transparency on employ-
ment matters. For instance, shareholders have repeatedly pressed
Wal-Mart to publicly disclose its Equal Employment Opportunity Re-
port, which identifies employees by race and sex in each Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission-defined job category; describes
affirmative action programs; and describes programs to increase fe-
male and minority management. Public availability of such reports
would allow an assessment of whether Wal-Mart is promoting a
greater percentage of female associates after the Dukes litigation. Al-
though Wal-Mart had repeatedly refused, 121 it quietly reversed course
and posted such reports to the Internet in 2006.122
In addition to the alleged continued wrongdoing, Wal-Mart has also
attempted to undermine class action litigation more generally. 123 Al-
118. Nelson Lichtenstein, Op-Ed., Wal-Mart's Authoritarian Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 21,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/opinion/22Lichtenstein.html?_r=O.
119. Liza Featherstone, Wal-Mart Execs Testimony Could Help Sex Bias Suit, WENEWS, http:/
/womensenews.org/story/the-courts/030501/wal-mart-execs-testimony-could-hep-sex-bias-suit#.
URHDaI6oXdE (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
120. "As late as 2003, Wal-Mart Stores' CEO Coughlin was not aware of any diversity goals or
whether managers had met such goals. Many store managers were also unaware of the existence
of any diversity goals." Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, supra note 116.
121. See Wal-Mart (WMT) Equal Employment Opportunity Report, WIKINVEST (Apr. 15,
2005), http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Wal-Mart-(WMT)/Equal-Employment-Opportunity_
Report.
122. See Press Release, Interfaith Ctr. on Corporate Responsibility, Wal-Mart Reports on its
EEO Data and Programs; Setting a National Standard for all U.S. Companies (Apr. 11, 2006),
available at http://www.iccr.org/news/press-releases/2006/pr-wmteeoreportO4ll06.htm.
123. Sarah Jaffe, Destroying Communities, Abusing Workers: What's (Still) the Matter with
Wal-Mart, ALTERNET (July 5, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/story/156188/destroying-communi-
ties%2Cabusing-workers%3A what%27s_%28still%29_the matterwithwal-mart (noting
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though the use of lobbying efforts to limit litigation is not in and of
itself a wrong, when coupled with legally or morally noncompliant em-
ployment policies, it helps buttress the accusation of a whitewash.
Most notably, Wal-Mart made sizeable donations to and served on the
board of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), 124 a
corporate-funded tort reform organization. 125 This group drafts
model bills for state legislatures, 126 including the very defendant-
friendly Class Actions Improvements Act. 127 In what was likely a re-
sponse to the Dukes litigation, ALEC crafted a bill that would delay
the evidence-gathering phase of a class action lawsuit until any ap-
peals concerning the legitimacy of the class have been exhausted. 128
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decertification in Dukes, such a
bill would prevent the plaintiffs in the California and Texas class ac-
tions from interviewing witnesses, gathering documents, or engaging
in other essential preparations regarding the development of their
substantive claims until the class certification issue was definitively re-
solved. 129 Such a bill has been introduced in Minnesota 130 and copy-
cat bills in other states seem likely to follow.1 31
C. Intent to Restore, Maintain, or Enhance Reputation
Lastly, in order to show an extralegal whitewash, one has to draw a
convincing connection between the new reputation-enhancing behav-
that Wal-Mart spent $7.8 million on lobbying in 2011 on trade policy, corporate tax policy, and
other employer-oriented policies).
124. Id. (noting that Wal-Mart recently left ALEC over the stand-your-ground controversy);
see also Dreier & Cohen, supra note 112 (noting Wal-Mart's departure from ALEC in May 2012
over ALEC's "aggressive support for 'Stand Your Ground' laws").
125. About ALEC, AM. LEGIs. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/about-alec (last vis-
ited, Feb. 5, 2013).
126. See Brendan Fischer, ALEC and "Tort Reform", PR WATCH (July 13, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10886/alec-and-tort-reform.
127. The revisions would make class action suits available only for those litigants who do not
seek any monetary relief. It would also direct courts that plaintiffs seeking class certification
must provide clear and convincing evidence that the class meets all certification requirements,
with doubt resolved in favor of denying class certification, and create a rebuttable presumption
in favor of certification denial. The revisions would also codify the requirement that plaintiffs
have the financial burden of notifying class members. See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL,
MODEL CLASS ACTIONS IMPROVEMENTS ACT § 2(b)(2), (c)(3)-(4), (c)(7) (2000), available at
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland-migratin/files/pdfs/7882.pdf.
128. Jessica Pieklo, ALEC Makes Another Push for "Tort Reform", CARE 2 MAKE A DIFFER-
ENCE (Feb. 5, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/alec-makes-another-push-for-tort-
reform.html.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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ior and the prior (and potentially ongoing) bad behavior.132 Even if
one views Wal-Mart. as a wrongdoer, why would Wal-Mart feel the
need to engage in gender washing? Given the size of the Dukes
class-the largest employment class action. ever certified-and the
amount of money at stake, the Dukes litigation generated an enor-
mous amount of media attention. 133 Much of this coverage painted
Wal-Mart in a negative light and, in tandem with the litigation itself,
may have damaged Wal-Mart with respect to its customers, employ-
ees, and stockholders, as well as with potential regulators and policy-
makers, both domestically and abroad.
First, the widespread belief that Wal-Mart is a sex discriminator
could depress sales through consumer boycotts and loss of goodwill. I
have suggested elsewhere that many Wal-Mart shoppers might be
fairly insensitive on this front as they cannot afford to shop else-
where.1 34 Even if this holds true into the future, Wal-Mart has ex-
pressed much interest in growing its customer base domestically. A
bad reputation on gender issues may stall its attempts to garner well-
heeled consumers 135 as well as slow its move into urban areas. 136
The Dukes litigation may have also eroded Wal-Mart's vibrant cor-
porate culture, a culture often credited for the retailer's success. 137
132. Because whitewashes involve an element of diversion or deception, one would not expect
Wal-Mart to explicitly link their initiatives and policy changes to the lawsuit because that might
be construed as an acknowledgment of a problem, even if not an admission of prior wrongdoing.
Outside groups who have drawn these connections include the AFL-CIO, the United Food and
Commercial Workers campaign Making Change at Wal-Mart, and NOW. Cf. Kari Lydersen,
Wal-Mart and Women: Skeptics Question New Initiative, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011, 7:00
AM), http://www.inthesetimes.com/working/entry/l1982/walmart and-womenskeptics-
question new initiative.
133. A quick Lexis search revealed that since 2006, journalists have penned over 2,000 related
stories, and numerous blogs have followed the litigation developments. At least one journalist
wrote a book on the underlying complaints. See LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT:
THE LANDMARK BATTLF FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004).
134. Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 120 (2011).
135. Anne D'lnnocenzio, Again? Wal-Mart's Rep Takes Another Beating, ASSOCIATED PRESS
FIN. WIRE (May 11, 2012, 10:54 PM) (noting that reputation is more important to customers who
can afford to shop elsewhere).
136. Jung, supra note 108, at 37, 70 (noting that Wal-Mart wants to expand into major cities,
but concerns about labor practices is keeping its stores out).
137. When employees identify strongly with a corporation's organizational identity, they are
more likely to act in the company's best interest. Ale Smidts et al., The Impact of Employee
Communication and Perceived External Prestige on Organizational Identification, 44 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 1051, 1051 (2001). Strong corporate culture has also been credited with revitalizing
companies in decline. Cf. Charles O'Reilly, Corporations, Culture, and Commitment: Motivation
and Social Control in Organizations, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1989, at 9, 9-10. The Wal-Mart
culture is stronger in China than perhaps anywhere in the world, and Wal-Mart has been particu-
larly successful in China. See David J. Davies, Wal-Mao: The Discipline of Corporate Culture
and Studying Success at Wal-Mart China, CHINA J., July 2007, at 1, 1-2.
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Both the lawsuit and the surrounding publicity directly question the
legitimacy and morality of that corporate culture by challenging Wal-
Mart's vision of itself as good for workers, good for America, 138 and
good for women. Wal-Mart's idea of what constitutes "good for
women" may differ significantly from the Dukes plaintiffs, but the
negative press might still bruise Wal-Mart's positive self-identification.
In addition, bad corporate practices that raise the specter of regula-
tory and legal sanctions can depress stock price and deter invest-
ment.139 In particular, Wal-Mart's reputation as unfriendly to women,
and to labor more generally, deters socially responsible investors.
Some investors refuse to initiate a relationship, while others have
divested from Wal-Mart as a result of its perceived bad behavior.140
In contrast, the creation of new social initiatives, like the Global
Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative, may help Wal-Mart
sway socially responsible investors. For instance, one investment ana-
lyst has described Wal-Mart's initiatives as positioning it as the
twenty-first century leader, whereas "for most of the [twentieth] cen-
tury they acted like a [nineteenth] century company in terms of what
socially was expected of them. '141
Lastly, Wal-Mart is aggressively trying to break into foreign mar-
kets. 142 Yet its low price, big-box business model is an awkward fit for
some of its attempted new markets, 143 in part because of those coun-
138. The Wal-Mart Foundation is the United States' largest corporate donor, providing over
$750 million globally last year. Taylor Kuykendall, Hinton Native to Lead Charitable Efforts of
Walmart Foundation, REG.-HERALD, Oct. 18, 2011, http://www.register-herald.com/todays-
frontpage/x202l668544/Hinton-native-to-lead-charitable-efforts-of-Walmart-Foundation.
139. For instance, Wal-Mart's Mexico corruption scandal caused its stock to plummet.
D'Innocenzio, supra note 135 ("Wal-Mart acknowledged that the bad publicity was beginning to
hurt its stock. Its shares fell [20%] from early 2005 to an eight-year low of $42 two years later.");
Dreier & Cohen, supra note 112 (observing that Wal-Mart's stock price fell sharply soon after
the Mexico story broke).
140. Jung, supra note 108, at 36, 70-71 (noting the divestiture of socially responsible investors
because of Wal-Mart's labor policies and investment managers' suggestions that Wal-Mart's rep-
utation with its workers was part of the problem).
141. Id. at 72.
142. Much of Wal-Mart's recent growth came from its international division. In the last fiscal
year, sales in the U.S. rose 1.5% and operating income rose 2.2%; meanwhile, international sales
rose 15.2% and operating income rose 10.8%. Maria Kiselyova, Analysis: Cautious Wal-Mart
Missing Out on Russia's Retail Boom, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/04105/us-walmart-russia-idUSBRE8340KT20120405; see also Whalen, supra note 90.
143. Wal-Mart was unsuccessful in its attempts to expand in South Korea and Japan, where it
failed to anticipate cultural preferences, as well as the incompatibility of its distribution and sales
models with high-density, urban areas. Additionally, Wal-Mart failed in Germany and may be
unable to enter markets in the European Union due to high gasoline prices, as well as pro-labor
and smart growth policies. Manlio Del Giudice, Wal-Mart and Cross-Cultural Approaches to
Strategic Competitiveness, in CROss-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: FOSTERING INNO-
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tries' pro-labor cultures. 144 Given its mixed expansion record, large
social initiatives could improve its reputation and garner greater gov-
ernmental and public support. 145 Even for those markets largely in-
different to Wal-Mart's labor reputation, such initiatives continue to
generate positive domestic press while simultaneously creating a
ready pool of female workers and female suppliers.
Of course, a desire to establish, maintain, or restore a reputation
damaged by the Dukes litigation need not be the sole motivating force
for Wal-Mart's behavior to constitute an extralegal whitewash. One
could imagine many other reasons why Wal-Mart might engage in
such policies and practices. For example, Wal-Mart has suffered from
bad press over a variety of other labor 146 and non-labor issues;147 thus,
at least some of its social initiatives might be part of a larger white-
wash effort. In addition, Wal-Mart receives significant tax benefits
from its philanthropic behavior, and it can use that behavior to lever-
age state and local governments on other issues. Moreover, Wal-Mart
has conducted studies that identify its economic interests in using fe-
male-owned small businesses as suppliers. 148 But for purposes of a
whitewash, so long as Wal-Mart is responding to the Dukes litigation
with the policies identified in this Part, it does not matter what other
considerations motivate its behavior.
IV. A NORMATIVE AND DYNAMIC ASSESSMENT OF WASHING
A. Harms
Washing, in all its many forms, poses a risk of both individualized
and generalized harms to society. Though others may exist, I have
isolated at least four distinct harms: (1) the emotional harms arising
from the failure to acknowledge wrongdoing to the aggrieved; (2) the
emotional harm arising from treating individuals as fungible; (3) the
avoidance of systematic correction of wrongful practices; and (4) the
VATION AND COLLABORATION INSIDE THE MULTICULTURAL ENTERPRISE 103, 113-14 (Manilo
Del Guidice et al. eds., 2012).
144. Cf Kiselyova, supra note 142.
145. Jung, supra note 108, at 72 (noting that Wal-Mart's social policies are partially responsi-
ble for South Africa's approval of its relationship with Massmart).
146. Dreier & Cohen, supra note 112 (observing other bad behavior, including the recent U.S.
Department of Labor order to pay $4.8 million in backpay and fines to thousands of employees
who were illegally denied overtime).
147. These include a $24 million bribery scandal in Mexico that may lead to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act charges. See id.; see also Jaffe, supra note 123 (noting media attention to bribery
scandal in Mexico, reports of abuses at seafood suppliers, and a 10,000 person march against
Wal-Mart in Los Angeles' Chinatown).
148. Walmart, Partners Release Unprecedented Women Economic Impact Study, WALMART
CORPORATE (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.walmartstores.com/pressroomnews/9417.aspx.
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creation of an opportunity to expand or accelerate wrongful practices.
First, many aggrieved persons often desire an acknowledgement or
admission of wrongdoing. For those individuals, class action lawsuits
constitute more than a pursuit of monetary damages or injunctions;
they are a mechanism for naming and acknowledging their harms. For
those aggrieved who feel they have suffered dignitary insults, full
apologies may also be particularly important.149 This is because a full
apology from the wrongdoer serves to deny the diminishment of the
aggrieved and affirms their individual value. 150 But the act of the cor-
porate whitewasher definitionally precludes such acknowledgements;
the wrongdoer wishes to not only divert attention away from its bad
behavior, but also leave its underlying ways unchanged. 151
In addition, a company enacting a whitewash often treats those indi-
viduals it has harmed as though they are fungible with all other people
along a relevant harm axis. Similarly, a company often treats a con-
cern of the aggrieved as fungible with any other concern they might
have. For instance, in a gender wash, the corporation often provides
assistance to a different group of women than those who were
harmed-one might perceive Wal-Mart's gender initiatives in this
light. The vast majority of its efforts are geared at either women in
the company who could not have joined the class action lawsuit, or
women who are not Wal-Mart employees. Importantly, those who
have been injured are aware that a net gain for a group of which they
are a member is not the same as redressing an individual or systematic
wrong; by treating people and their concerns as fungible, wrongdoers
only add insult to injury. As Ekow Yankah explained in another con-
text, such hypocrisy communicates that the wrongdoer does not take
the aggrieved persons "seriously as agents with moral claims deserving
149. A full apology includes:
expression of embarrassment and chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct
had been expected and sympathizes with the application of negative sanction; verbal
rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong way of behaving along with vilifica-
tion of the self that so behaved; espousal of the right way and an avowal henceforth to
pursue that course; performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution.
ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113 (1971).
150. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 477-78 (2003). Apologies may also alleviate the
aggrieved's concern about the possible repetition of such behavior. Cf. FRITZ HEIDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 269 (1958).
151. If a wrongdoer both provides a full apology and implements initiatives to rehabilitate its
image, it is no longer engaged in a wash, as I define it.
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of respect or to whom uses of power need be justified. ' 152 This behav-
ior reinforces "to its direct victims their inferiority and insults them by
ignoring their nature as rational agents. '153 Such substitutions of any
one member of the group for another denies the "uniqueness and in-
dividuality" of those harmed.154
Moreover, effective washing allows a wrongdoer to avoid systemati-
cally correcting the underlying grievance and also to defuse any
reputational damage associated with the identified wrongdoing. The
kind of significant wrongdoing targeted by class action or other high-
profile litigation is often, though not always, subject to social sanction-
ing. As explained above, a poor reputation can spur consumer boy-
cotts, divestment by investors, a decline in worker productivity, a
break in supplier relationships, and a limit on new sources of capital
and access to new markets. However, reputational sanctions rely on
an appreciation of and attention to the wrongdoing that successful
washes are designed to preclude or overshadow. In so doing, the kind
of hypocrisy a whitewash entails also "frustrates the normative claims
of those victims by undermining the language in which they can press
their claims and obscuring the validity of those claims to those to
whom they are addressed. ' 155
Relatedly, some washes may even expand and accelerate the
wrongdoer's bad behavior. If a corporate whitewasher restores or en-
hances its reputation, it may find access to new customers, new em-
ployees, new investors, and new markets. In addition, the wash itself
may entail expanding access to these various resources. To take a par-
ticularly salient hypothetical, if Wal-Mart is a wrongdoer, its new
Global Women's Economic Empowerment Initiative may globalize its
alleged sex discrimination and poor labor practices. Not only would a
successful wash counteract any reputational hit that drives away cus-
tomers, employees, and investors, the initiative would also help open
new markets and attract employees. If Wal-Mart's washing helps gar-
ner support for new stores in foreign locations and the hiring at those
stores is not accompanied by antidiscrimination efforts, Wal-Mart may
simply increase its use of gender discrimination. 156
152. Ekow N. Yankah, Legal Hypocrisy (forthcoming) (on file with author). In fairness, Pro-
fessor Yankah is referencing a specific type of hypocrisy in which the state is using the law to act.
Wal-Mart is not engaging in legal hypocrisy but many of the effects are the same.
153. Id.
154. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1987).
155. Yankah, supra note 152.
156. In fact, women in these countries may be even more vulnerable than female employees
in the United States, and thus willing to work for even more substandard wages. Wal-Mart
would have the option of sorting to hire women that it thinks it can most exploit.
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B. Benefits
All told, critics may too quickly dismiss the possible positive exter-
nalities generated by a wash. Just because washes, by definition, do
not provide the aggrieved's desired remedy, it does not follow that all
washes lack social value. A diversionary intent need not prevent new
corporate behavior from helping employees, consumers, investors, or
even society at large. For example, even if one believed that the be-
havior described in the Wal-Mart case study was motivated largely by
the desire to deflect attention away from the Dukes litigation, the pos-
sibility exists that Wal-Mart's Global Women's Economic Empower-
ment Initiative and internal changes might transform many individual
women's lives for the better. This Part identifies at least three poten-
tial benefits of an extralegal whitewash: (1) positive externalities aris-
ing from the diversionary behavior; (2) structural reform arising from
the failure to control the extralegal whitewash; and (3) reputational
harm arising from the unsuccessful implementation of an extralegal
whitewash.
The assessment of when an extralegal whitewash will provide sub-
stantial or net benefits over the status quo requires a case-by-case as-
sessment of the new policies and practices. The presence of
accountability mechanisms that allow ongoing review and criticism of
washes would be a good signal for commitment to future success.
These accountability mechanisms may come in the form of transpar-
ent targets, goals, standards, or binding legal obligations. In addition,
washes that require significant ongoing expenditures and create new
institutions may also bespeak the potential for change. This is particu-
larly likely if the new institution is staffed by outsiders who have ex-
pertise and commitment to the issue area of the wash. Similarly, the
design of such "washed" institutions can also enhance the possibility
of corporate social change. 157
To return to our hypothesized Wal-Mart gender wash, some factors
point in the direction of net positive social value. Wal-Mart is taking a
leadership role in the training of women and use of female suppliers.
Although many other programs have committed resources to these
sorts of goals, few governments, much less corporations, have engaged
this group of women with resources as extensive as those provided by
Wal-Mart. Thus, even though Wal-Mart's efforts are not different in
kind, the difference in scope is meaningful. Similarly, although Wal-
Mart could abandon the initiative, given the economic and political
157. Cf Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the
Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1718 (2010).
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resources it has already expended, abandonment might prove to be
quite costly. Relatedly, while Wal-Mart's initiative is voluntary, it
does contain some accountability measures. Wal-Mart has pledged to
spend certain amounts for various programs and set spending targets
for particular markets. Corporate watchdogs can confirm whether
such funds are actually disbursed.
In addition to the positive externalities, some washes may ulti-
mately spur the company to structurally address the original grievance
in a manner consistent with the original demands of the aggrieved.
Regardless of a company's intention, it cannot guarantee others' re-
sponse to or its control of a whitewash. 158 When an extralegal white-
wash entrenches or sparks sustained interactions with outside
institutions and outside actors, it can create the conditions for substan-
tial policy evolution, which may deviate from the original underlying
interests of the corporations. These sustained institutional linkages
foster a cross-pollination of approaches and assumptions, which may
manifest themselves in new policies. 159 Such overhauls are particu-
larly likely when other institutions or actors have some decision-mak-
ing authority and these groups share a similar perspective to the
aggrieved.
Conversely, when companies engage in the sorts of whitewashes
least likely to have positive social value, such behavior can actually
magnify the harm to corporations, at least when corporate watchdogs
effectively police them.160 This sort of reputational backlash is partic-
ularly likely for large companies and those engaged in aggressively
visible campaigns. 161 In other words, when companies attempt to con-
158. For instance, the fictional advertisment alluded to in this Article's introduction helps
Sterling Cooper Draper Pryce land a pro bono anti-smoking campaign, but fails to generate
much paying business. As a business man explains to Don Draper, "He loves your work. They
all do. But they don't like you. I mean how could they trust you after the way you bit the
hand?" Mad Men: At the Codfish Ball (AMC television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012).
159. Wexler, supra note 157, at 1742.
160. As an example of how whitewashing can lead to regulation in 2007, TerraChoice, a green
marketing firm, studied six leading stores who sold over 1,000 products marketed as being green.
Only one product passed the test, while the rest were "demonstrably false" or "misleading." In
response to public scrutiny, the government revised the "Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims," and Congress increased the National Organic Program budget to $7 million.
Greg Northen, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive Green Marketing in an Increasingly
Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. Food L. & POL'Y 101, 104 (2011). Although the "Green Guides"
define environmental terms such as "biodegradable" and "ozone safe," they are merely a set of
voluntary guidelines. While they are not enforceable, they are given deference in litigated mat-
ters. Several states have since codified the rules into law. Id. at 111.
161. Kent Walker & Fang Wan, The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-Washing: Corpo-
rate Actions and Communications on Environmental Performance and Their Financial Implica-
tions, 109 J. Bus. ETHICS 227, 237 (2012).
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trol their reputation through cheap talk, but their hypocrisy is visible
to relevant stakeholders, 162 empirical evidence demonstrates that ef-
fective policing of washing can accelerate negative social sanctions be-
cause stakeholders view the company as untrustworthy and
opportunistic. 163
Lastly, it is worth noting that any of these benefits must be balanced
against the likelihood of the aggrieved prevailing in the absence of an
extralegal whitewash. As many have written in this volume, class cer-
tification is increasingly difficult and many barriers to success in cor-
porate social litigation exist.
C. The Ongoing Interaction of Law and Reputation
While extralegal washing can undermine efforts to seek individual
remedies and structural changes, the corporate whitewasher's interac-
tion with law is dynamic. Just as companies may use extralegal white-
washes to avoid or dampen the reputational sanctions of law, the
aggrieved may use law to counteract or reform extralegal washes. In
fact, the possibility of washing reinforces the need for reputation-in-
sensitive forums in which claims can be adjudicated. Although judges
and juries are not perfectly insulated from reputational concerns and
might be swayed by their own knowledge of the defendants' good be-
havior, extralegal whitewashes generally do not change the terms of
the underlying litigation itself. Corporate washes do not themselves
destroy evidence or alter the law governing the original suit, though
they may make future suits for those similarly situated more difficult.
Once again taking Wal-Mart and the Dukes litigation as an exam-
ple, a corporate whitewash does not much alter the potential of future
litigation in this case itself. The EEOC can still pursue charges164 and
162. Id. at 231.
163. Id.
164. The EEOC can bring charges on its own volition without having to worry about class
action certification because it is not bound by Rule 23. In June 2011, the EEOC began contem-
plating its role in this process. See Transcript of June 22, 2011 Meeting, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-
PORTUNITY COMMISSION (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-22-
11/transcript.cfm. The EEOC has shown a willingness to sue Wal-Mart in the past over both
individual claims and group claims. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n,
Walmart to Pay More than $11.7 Million to Settle EEOC Sex Discrimination Suit (Mar. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroomlrelease/3-1-10.cfm (announcing a suit against a
distribution center for failure to hire women into a particular position); see also Press Release,
U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Disability Discrimination
and Retaliation (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-15-
llc.cfm (announcing a suit over a failure to accommodate an individual with a disability and
retaliation for requesting accommodation); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, Walmart Sued for Religious Discrimination (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-1-lOc.cfm (announcing a suit over a failure to discuss relig-
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plaintiffs still have access to state-based class actions, such as those in
Texas and California.1 65 In addition, over 1,900 women from the origi-
nal nationwide class have filed individual suits.1 66 To the extent those
suits may be unsuccessful, Wal-Mart's initiatives and programs in and
of themselves probably do not speak to the plaintiffs' prospects.
If, however, plaintiffs win these suits, courts could both grant them
individual remedies and force structural changes to Wal-Mart's em-
ployment practices. None of the alleged extralegal whitewashing af-
fects the courts' remedial powers. Moreover, in cases of bad faith, the
aggrieved may wield law to force companies to provide messages con-
trary to their attempted extralegal whitewash. To use a different real
life Wal-Mart example, a group of deaf warehouse workers sued Wal-
Mart for refusing to hire them. When Wal-Mart failed to comply with
a decree ordering it to provide interpreters to these workers, the dis-
trict court's contempt finding encouraged Wal-Mart to accept an
amended decree that required Wal-Mart "to air a professionally pro-
duced 90-second TV ad featuring the charging parties telling their sto-
ries in American Sign Language with a voiceover. 1 67 An even more
vivid example might be the 1988 tobacco state settlement, through
which tobacco companies agreed to fund the creation of the American
Legacy Foundation to "produce and publish anti-smoking advertise-
ments aimed at reducing youth tobacco usage. ' 168 The American
Legacy Foundation went on to create the notoriously anti-corporate,
anti-smoking "Truth" campaign.
In addition to litigation, the aggrieved and their supporters can also
pursue legislation and other forms of regulation to address their un-
derlying concerns. Of course, the push for legislation is usually more
ious accommodation). So far, however, the EEOC has not filed charges related to the Dukes
litigation.
165. Press Release, PR Newswire, Wal-Mart Women Plaintiffs File Expanded Texas Class Ac-
tion (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/prnewswire/press-releases/2012/01/
19/DC39005 (describing the regional complaint Odle v. Wal-Mart filed in Texas, which covers
more than 50,000 current or former women employees).
166. Pat Murphy, Wal-Mart Suits over Equal Pay Approach 2,000, LAW. USA WKLY. UP-
DATE, June 18, 2012, at 1 (noting that 1,975 pay and promotion charges were filed with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by women making similar claims of sex
discrimination).
167. Transcript of June 22, 2011 Meeting, supra note 167. "The ad was shown over two weeks
on ABC, CBS, and NBC during the shows such as Good Morning America, The Today Show,
and Meet the Press." Id.
168. Evidence suggests that the campaign succeeded in its goal of reducing youth smoking.
Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Evidence of a Dose-Response Relationship Between "Truth" Antis-
moking Ads and Youth Smoking Prevalence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425 (2005). Other
publicity sanctions could include confessions of knowing violation of statutes in newspapers and
trade journals and conducting seminars for other companies.
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sensitive to reputation and public perception than lawsuits, but even
as companies pursue their extralegal whitewashes, the aggrieved can
provide a different narrative to encourage legislative and regulatory
change. For instance, in response to limitations on class actions for
plaintiffs similarly situated to those in Dukes, policymakers have in-
troduced the Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act
(EEORA). t 69 The EEORA provides a new mechanism for workers
to challenge discriminatory decision-making processes and weaken
the role of an employer's written nondiscrimination policies in litiga-
tion.170 Efforts for such legislative reform may be mobilized by highly
visible litigation losses.171 Thus, even if Wal-Mart engages in an extra-
legal wash, the Dukes litigation might spur heightened support for
currently proposed legislation, such as the Paycheck Fairness Act.172
This legislation would help provide a structural remedy to similarly
situated employees across time and space, by forcing corporations to
demonstrate wage discrepancies are based on genuine business
requirements.
Finally, extralegal whitewashes operate in the shadow of the law,
but can themselves become targets of the law as well. In some in-
stances, law might be deployed to challenge the extralegal whitewash
itself. For example, litigants have successfully challenged corporate
169. Luther Turmelle, Bill Will Counter Court's Wal-Mart Ruling, NEW HAVEN REG., June 21,
2012, at A12 (discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act as a counter to
the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes).
170. Deborah J. Vagins, On the First Anniversary of Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Stand Up or Be
Trampled, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
deborah-j-vagins/wal-mart-v-dukes b 1612138.html. The EEORA would
provide an alternative mechanism for workers to join together to enforce their rights to
a discrimination-free workplace; clarify that workers can challenge the unfettered dis-
cretion of supervisors in their subjective decision-making to the same extent as other
employment practices; ensure that an employers' [sic] written nondiscrimination poli-
cies are only relevant in determining if a group action can move forward when the
policies have been consistently and effectively implemented; and restore courts' discre-
tion to determine the correct method for assessing how victims of discrimination should
be made whole.
Id.
171. For instance, a plaintiff-unfriendly decision led to the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which ex-
tended the statute of limitations for equal pay claims. See Ledbetter v. GoodYear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); see also Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123
Stat. 5.
172. See Scott T. Schutte & Ronald E. Manthey, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Supreme Court An-
nounces New Class Action Standards that Will Substantially Curtail Employment Discrimination
Class Actions, as Well as Consumer, Antitrust, and Other Class Actions, NAT'L L. REV. (June 28,
2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/dukes-v-wal-mart-supreme-court-announces-new-
class-action-standards-will-substantially-curta.
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social responsibility initiatives under false advertising laws,173 as well
as under corporate disclosure and misrepresentation laws. 174 The
Federal Trade Commission can also instigate litigation against corpo-
rate washers for material misrepresentations to consumers. 175 Simi-
larly, for those extralegal whitewashes aimed at employees, companies
may find that aspirational but unenforced language in codes of con-
duct or employee handbooks open the possibility of tort or contract
liability. 176
V. CONCLUSION
Law has many mechanisms to encourage corporations to engage in
socially desirable behavior. This Article suggests that more attention
should be paid to the sort of extralegal responses that class action and
other high-profile litigation may inspire. While this Article takes a
first step at defining corporate whitewashes in the litigation context,
more work is needed. How will the Dukes holding implicate compa-
nies' decisions to engage in corporate washing? What insights can the
empirical record bring to bear on the question of when corporate
washes lead to structural reform? Will calls for increased trans-
parency allow effective extralegal policing of corporate washes? If
not, how ought the law intervene in corporate washes?
173. In Kasky v. Nike, a citizen sued Nike for misrepresentation under California's false ad-
vertising law, as conditions in their Vietnamese factories did not match the company's state-
ments to the press and public. Claims that workers were paid double the minimum wage,
received meals and health care, and were protected from sexual abuse did not match actual
conditions. Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002).
174. Competitors may also sue each other for damages or injunctions under the Lanham Act
if there has been a material misrepresentation that likely affected consumer choice and diverted
sales from the plaintiff. Vos, supra note 17, at 691-92. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates
disclosure of off-sheet transactions and liabilities that may affect the current or future financial
condition of a firm, which may include environmental obligations. Id. at 693.
175. Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor
for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 367, 395 (2008).
176. Id. at 396-97.
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